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ABSTRACT 
The  majority  of  monitored  fish  stocks  globally  is  fully  or  over  exploited,  that  is,  at  or  below  their 
maximum  sustainable  yield  stock  levels.  Despite  this  resource  situation  international  trade  in  fish 
products have been increasing for a long time. An export tax on fish and fish products, as an alternative to 
Pigouvian harvest or effort taxes, is introduced in a resource-trade model for a small open economy. It is 
analysed to what extent such a tax could mitigate biological and economic overuse of fish stocks and 
increase national welfare, which is affected both through the general government budget and through 
effects  on  consumer  surpluses.  We  also  discuss  briefly  implications  for  aquaculture  environment, 
production and trade. It is demonstrated that a resource export tax may be beneficial for total national 
welfare compared to a laissez-faire policy. The theoretical analysis is illustrated by a stylized case study 
for a small open economy.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
International  trade  is  liberalised  and  increasing  and  there  has  been  debate  about  the  welfare  and 
environmental effects of this, in particular for developing countries exporting natural resource goods, 
whether managed or open-access. Some fear that this may harm both welfare and resource stocks in 
export countries, others are convinced that most, if not all, countries will benefit from increased trade [3, 
7, 13, 14]. Policy advisers and international economic policy organisations usually favour a reduction in 
trade taxes, but governments may be concerned about loss of revenues from such a reduction. In the 
1970s and 1980s the average share of trade tax in total tax revenues was about a third and a quarter in 
Africa  and  Asia,  respectively,  though  slowly  decreasing  [7].  Trade  tax  revenues  mainly  come  from 
import, but for some countries export taxes amount to an important share of trade tax revenue. ‘In 2000, 8 
out of 12 countries for which data were available had more than 10% of trade tax revenue from export 
taxes; 5 of them having more than 20% [7, p.278].  
 
For a country in transition from autarchy to free trade, defined by the rules and regulations of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), tax revenue is just one concern. Others are related to economic development, 
the environment and how to finance the government budget. Openings for (more) trade for a small open 
economy mean changes in domestic relative prices and changes in the export and import shares of goods 
and services. Gains from trade for a country exporting a renewable good have been discussed in several 
papers. One such seminal study concludes ‘that trade reduces steady state utility for a diversified resource 
exporter [2, p. 526]. This conclusion is based on a two-sector general equilibrium model with an open-
access renewable resource industry and a manufacturing industry with constant returns to scale. Another 
article on this issue concluded ‘that opening up for trade may result in steady-state gains from trade, even 
when there is open access to the resource and the country does not specialise fully in resource extraction’ 
when ‘the Brander-Taylor small, open-economy model of trade in a renewable resource and other goods 
is modified to allow for diminishing returns to the other goods sector’ [10, p.122].  
 
Sustainable development discussions are often concerned about three sub-sets of sustainability; economic, 
environmental and social development. Even though there may be differing views when it comes to 
operational definitions of these concepts, we shall use them in this paper within the framework of a two-
sector general equilibrium model that combines and develops elements from Brander and Taylor [2], [10] IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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and [7]. We analyse the economic, environmental and social effects of using an export tax on goods from 
the open-access renewable resource industry. For fish resources the majority of stocks globally are fully 
exploited or overexploited, that is, at or below their maximum sustainable-yield stock-level [8] and it is of 
interest to find policy instruments to mitigate resource degradation. 
 
 The trade regimes we discuss within a two-sector general equilibrium model are  
Initially:  autarchy  with  domestic  open-access  exploitation  of  a  renewable  resource  (fish  or  another 
relatively fast-growing renewable resource). Domestic prices differ from world market prices. 
Open trade commences: world and domestic market prices are equalised. Expected price increase for the 
resource good may lead to overexploitation and reduced domestic consumption of this good.  
Export taxes introduced - to mitigate possible negative effects of open trade.
a 
 
The main objective of this paper is to analyse and compare the economic, environmental and social 
results of the taxed export regime with those of open trade. It will be demonstrated that the former are 
superior to the latter. 
 
THE MODEL  
 
Following [2] (BT) and [10] (RH), we assume that growth of the renewable natural resource follows the 
logistic growth function familiar in fisheries economics literature. Other renewable resources, such as 
wildlife, forest resources and pollution purification, may also have a growth curve that is a humped shape, 
if not as simple and well-behaved as in this equation. Trees, however, usually grow much slowly than 
fish. 
 
Logistic population growth with carrying capacity normalised to unity and with harvest y is 
   
 
 
assuming 0<S<1 to avoid cases of extinction and no harvest, with r as the intrinsic growth. 
 
Harvest follows the Schaefer production technology   
 
 
 
implying that catch per unit effort ly is proportional to stock size, with q as the catchability coefficient. 
Effort is assumed to consist of labour only that comes from a given total supply in competition with the 
other industry (see below).
b The other factor of production is the common -pool natural resource. The 
long-run steady-state catch is  
 
 
 
and require that 
q
r
ly   to avoid extinction. This assumption is made throughout the paper. 
 
We  shall  focus  on  steady-state  solutions  since  most  fish  resources  are  relatively  fast-growing  and 
transition periods tend to be short enough to allow us to neglect discounting. This is in line with RH, 
whereas BT analysed the transition period, but without using a positive discount rate. Of course, the main 
reason to focus on the steady state is to keep the analysis as simple as possible. We also neglect the 
intermediary industry that usually exists to transform raw fish into marketable goods, defending this on 
y S rS S    ) 1 (  ,                (Eq. 1)    
 
S ql y y  ,                  (Eq. 2)    
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q
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the assumption that such an industry has CRS technology with raw fish as the main variable input [1]. 
The ex-vessel price of fish will therefore move proportionally to the consumer price.  
 
The other industry produces goods x according to either constant returns to scale (CRS, with γ=1 as in 
BT) or to decreasing returns production technology (DRS, γ<1; with γ=<1/2 in RH) 
   
 
 
using labour lx as the only input. 
  
Input constraint, assuming full employment, requires 
 
 
 
with l as the total supply of labour. 
 
Open-access equilibrium in the resource industry requires the value of the average product of effort 
(labour) to be equal to marginal cost of effort,  ) ( ) ( y y y y l MC l VAP  , which implies 
 
  
 
 
when domestic price of fish, pD  and wage level, w, are considered constant.  
 
A necessary condition for equilibrium in the general industry is 
 
 
    
 
which follows from profit maximisation of  x wl x     wrt  x l , when the price of x is used as numeraire.  
 
Downward-sloping domestic resource demand equals 
 
 
 
which follows from utility maximisation, given a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
   
1 x y u  
for the representative consumer and the budget constraint  a x y pD   , where a is income. The 
difference between the world market and the domestic market fish price is because of a unit tax   on fish 
exports.   
 
The gross domestic product (GDP - production approach) is   
 
 
with p as the world market price of fish. 
 
Thus  
 
 

x al x  ,  0<γ≤1, x≥0,               (Eq. 3)  
 
y x l l l                     (Eq. 4)  
 
w l
r
q
q p y D   ) 1 ( ,                (Eq. 5)  
 
w alx 
1   ,                (Eq. 6)  
 
a b by p D D   
 ,
1 ,                (Eq. 7)  
 
x py R                     (Eq. 8)  
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For most seafood products traded internationally the primary product makes up a substantial part of the 
cost  of  the  final  product.  The  simplifying  assumption  about  CRS  technology  for  the  intermediaries 
between harvesters and consumers allows the use of mark-up pricing for the intermediaries. The world 
market price p is therefore assumed to be adjusted to reflect the relative content of the primary product in 
the final product.  
 
The quantity of fish produced is used either domestically, yD, or for export, yE 
 
 
 
Equations (1)-(10) comprise the model to be analysed in the following. It includes the main features of 
both BT and RH, including the important CRS of the former and the DRS of the latter. Our analysis will 
demonstrate that the use of a (fish) resource export tax is beneficial for both types of technology in the 
other industry. 
 
The production possibility frontier 
 
Before proceeding to analyse the effects of a resource export tax on production we shall demonstrate the 
production possibility frontier (PPF), for x and y, to get a graphical picture of its shape. This is done for 
the constant return-to-scale (CRS) case, i.e. for  1   , to keep it simple.  
 
For the resource industry, using (1) and (2), the following long-run restriction on harvest prevails 
 
 
 
 
From (11) and (3) follows in the CRS case of  1    
 
 
 
Thus y(x) describes the PPF. From (12) we derive the terminal points  ) ( min q
r
l a x    and  al x  max  for 
y=0. If there is a maximum of y this requires dy/dx=0, and from (11) we derive )
2
( * *
q
r
l a x   . 
Thus a maximum of y for a positive x requires  l
q
r

2
 and a positive  min x requires  l
q
r
 .  Since x ≥ 0 
we have  min x = 0. Figure 1 gives a graphical description of the PPF in case of a large resource sector, 
meaning 
q
r
l
q
r
 
2
. Note that  
q
r
ly   on a permanent basis implies extinction of the fish resource. A 
humped shape production possibility frontier may exist in cases where the renewable resource sector is of 
significant  size.  For  a  welfare-maximising  nation  only  the  negatively-sloped  part  of  the  production 
possibility  frontier  would  be  of  interest,  but  imperfect  property  rights  regimes  may  imply  ot her 
adaptations.  
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Figure 1. The production possibility frontier (PPF) may be hump-shaped in the case of a large resource 
sector. 
 
The resource export tax 
 
First we investigate whether or not it is possible to increase the gross domestic product, R, the production 
of fish, y, and/or the production of other goods, x, by introducing a resource export tax. Such a tax creates 
a wedge between the world market price and the domestic price of fish. By assumption (no other sales, 
value added taxes or subsidies exist) consumers and producers domestically face the same price, equal to 
the world market price minus the export tax. 
 
Assume  a  two-sector  open  economy  with  export  of  a  renewable  resource  good  produced  from  a 
renewable resource with logistic growth and harvesting that takes place under an open-access regime. 
If so: 
 
Proposition 1  
 
1.1 There is a positive export tax that will increase the gross domestic product.  
 
1.2 This is valid in both the case of constant returns to scale and the case of decreasing returns to scale 
in the other sector of the economy. 
 
1.3 This is valid independently of whether the open-trade solution causes biological overexploitation or 
not. 
 
1.4 The steady-state resource stock increases with the resource export tax. 
 
We shall start by proving Proposition 1.4. To find the effect on the open-access equilibrium stock of a 
resource export tax we use the labour market equilibrium equation  
 
 
 
 
derived from equations (5) and (6), having substituted for  x l  from (4). Since ly in (13) implicitly is a 
function of τ, we can find 
 
1 ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
    
   y y l l a l
r
q
q p ,          (Eq. 13)
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recalling that 
q
r
ly  .  At equilibrium harvesting it follows from (1) and (2) that  y l
r
q
S  1 . Thus 
 
 
 
 
 
and Proposition 1.4 is proved. 
 
In addition, from (14) it follows directly that  0 
 d
dlx , owing to (4). The resource export tax contributes 
unambiguously to the transfer of labour from the fishing industry to the other industry. The effect of this 
on production in each of the two industries can now be found; from (3) follows  0 
 d
dx
, and from (1) at 
biological equilibrium we have   0 ) 2 1 (     
  d
dS
S r
d
dy
 for   msy S S  
2
1
. The resource export 
tax unambiguously implies increased production in the other industry, whereas production in the resource 
industry increases only if the resource was already biologically overexploited. 
 
To prove Propositions 1.1-1.3, the effects on gross domestic product of a resource export tax, we use the 
labour market equilibrium equation (13). Since x and y now are functions of τ it follows also that the 
domestic product, R, is a function of the resource export tax. We are interested in how R is affected by τ, 
in particular to find the conditions for a positive effect. Substituting for  x l  from equation (4) in (8) we 
have  )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( (    y y y l l x l py l R    , and from this follows 
 
 
 
 
 
From (16) we conclude 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 1.1 is proved since the open-access condition for the harvest industry is VAPy=VMPx and, in 
this  model,  VMPy<VAPy.  Proposition  1.2  is  proved,  since  we  have  assumed  1    throughout  the 
analysis above. Proposition 1.3 holds, since the proofs above are valid whether VMP y<0 (biologically 
overexploited resource) or VMPy>0 (biologically underexploited resource), as long as (17) is fulfilled. 
Figure 2 illustrates these findings. 
0
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Figure 2. Equilibrium allocation of labour between the two industries of the economy depends on the 
trade and tax regimes. The open-trade level of labour in the resource industry is 
o
y l . The resource export 
tax moves ly  in the direction of  
*
y l  that maximises GDP. 
 
The gross domestic product increases with the resource export tax since the value of the marginal product 
of  labour  in  the  harvest  industry  is  l ess  than  the  value  of  the  marginal  product  of  labour  in  the 
manufacturing industry for the open-trade solution. There is, of course, a limit to this increase. Maximum 
of R with respect to τ requires  0 
 d
dR
, thus VMPy=VMPx from (16); the corresponding labour allocation 
to the harvest industry in this particular case is labelled 
*
y l  in Figure 2. Propositions 1.1-1.3 hold for the 
following labour allocation, ly, to the harvest industry 
o
y y y l l l  
* , where 
o
y l  is the open-trade level. 
 
Domestic consumption and export of the resource good 
 
To discuss domestic consumption of the resource good we should distinguish between the three regimes 
of autarchy, open trade and export taxed trade. For policy reasons it may be of interest to know how 
opening of trade, from autarchy, will change the domestic consumption of the resource good (as well as 
that of the other good), and how a resource export tax will further affect consumption. We will prove  
 
Proposition 2 
 
In this two-sector economy, domestic consumption of both the resource good and the other good will 
increase with the introduction of an export tax on the resource good compared with open  trade. 
 
It is possible to prove Proposition 2 in the same way as we proved Proposition 1, using the model 
equations and implicit derivation. In this case, however, it can be done even more simply. Initially we 
assume that the increased GDP, following the introduction of the resource export tax, is redistributed to 
consumers through a lump sum transfer. From the consumer behaviour described above we know that the IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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budget share for each good is constant and equal to the marginal elasticity of utility, 
a
y p D ) ( 


 . 
Now, domestic consumption, yD, increases if consumers’ income, a, increases, and/or the domestic price 
of the resource good decreases. This happens through a combination of the substitution effect and the 
income effect. For the other good the same arguments hold, since
a
xD    1 . QED. 
 
The  shifts  in  export,  consumption  and  resource  yield  are  demonstrated  in  Figure  3,  focusing  on  the 
somewhat  realistic  case  for  a  developing  country,  with  an  underexploited  biological  resource  under 
autarchy. Supply is the long-run backward-bending yield curve,  ) (p y
S , derived from VAPy= VMPx. for 
the  open-access  harvested  fish  stock  [5].  This  curve  has  the  traditional  upward-sloping  shape  for  a 
relatively low price of fish and is backward-bending from the point where price exceeds what is necessary 
to bring about the maximum sustainable yield. Assuming downward-sloping demand as in (7), based on 
maximisation of a Cobb-Douglas utility function and fixed income, the autarchy solution may be equal 
to
A
D y  in Figure 3. From this it is clear that international trade, either open or with a resource export tax, 
implies a reduction in the domestic consumption of the resource good, from
A
D y  to
C
D y  or
T
D y , respectively. 
Domestic consumption under taxed export is always higher than under open trade when the domestic 
consumer price equals the supply price for the resource harvest sector. The export of the resource good 
used in the example in Figure 3 is higher with taxed than with open export. Since, however, the exported 
quantity  of  the  resource  good  equals  the  difference  between  harvest  and  domestic  consumption, 
E y = ) (p y
S - ) (p y
D , it is obvious from this figure that export may decrease for  a lower world market 
price and/or a higher export tax, comparing taxed with open export. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The backward-bending supply curve and downward-sloping domestic demand are basics for 
graphical analysis of fish consumption and trade under the regimes of autarchy, open trade and export 
taxed trade. 
 
Aquaculture goods and export tax 
 
We shall distinguish between two cases of aquaculture and the environment. First, aquaculture may be 
dependent  on  input  of  wild-caught  fish.  If  this  fish  is  from  an  open-access  resource  and  goes  into IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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aquaculture feed in a fixed proportion, the analysis and conclusion above will hold. An export tax on 
aquaculture goods will induce a reduction in the aquaculture industry and thereby in the harvest industry 
as well. Second, if aquaculture is using environmental services, for example, mangrove forests, inflicting 
negative externalities on other producers or consumers, the previous analysis may be adapted to include 
this  scenario. To conclude,  an export tax  will have the same  positive  welfare  effects in the  case of 
aquaculture  as  for  the  renewable  resource  industry  above  if  there  is  a  negative  externality  in  the 
production of fish from aquaculture. 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
For several renewable natural resources and environmental goods traditional property or use rights are 
difficult to establish and to enforce in full. In such cases, as in fisheries, there are management challenges 
from economic, ecological and social (including employment and consumer surplus issues) perspectives. 
To mitigate such problems several policy instruments have been suggested and discussed in the literature. 
These include technical regulations, licences, Pigouvian taxes, total allowable catch (TAC), individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs), and marine protected areas (MPAs). In actual fisheries all of these instruments 
have been used, although Pigouvian taxes are rarely applied (exceptions include minor resource taxes in 
Vietnam, the research and salmon marketing export taxes in Norway and management cost recovery in 
New Zealand). 
 
The resource export tax discussed in this paper generates a triple win for the country, if we compare 
export taxed trade with open trade, since the natural resource stock, GDP and domestic consumption of 
the  resource  good  increase.  In  reality,  countries  have  a  public  sector  that  contributes  to  social 
sustainability and development, and RET helps to fund this without the negative effects of most tax 
wedges.  The  opposite,  in  fact,  holds:  the  RET  yields  positive  effects  as  the  tax  may  neutralise  the 
distortion of an open-access regime.  We could say that this policy instrument is positive from all three 
sustainability perspectives, environmental, economic and social. Theoretical, and applied, analyses of 
trade  liberalisation  for  fish  often  conclude  that  welfare  effects  may  be  negative  unless  efficient 
management systems are in place [13, 14]. RET would mitigate such problems even with an open-access 
resource industry. 
 
From  a  monitoring,  control  and  enforcement  (MCE)  perspective,  RET  may  have  some  advantages 
compared with a direct tax on fish harvest. First, in most actual cases harvesters are much more plentiful 
than exporters, and so is the number of landing places compared with the number of foreign trade exit 
points of a country. Taxing fewer and bigger entities may be simpler administratively than taxing many 
small  ones.  Second,  since  MCE  costs  are  likely  to  increase  with  the  number  of  people  and  firms 
operating, total administrative costs are likely to be lower for RET. Third, historically, foreign trade has 
been  monitored  rather  strictly  in  most  countries  to  ensure  the  financial  revenues  from  trade. 
Administrative systems for registration and tax collection already, therefore, exist.   
 
With particular regard to developing countries exporting food to developed countries there are strict rules 
and regulations to ensure food safety. Producers usually find domestic trade rules are easier to observe, 
and for local trade it may just be a matter of agreement between sellers and buyers at the beach, quayside 
or the local market. RET would therefore not apply directly to all fish production of a country. To what 
extent there are spillover effects between export, domestic and local markets and the harvesters, remains 
to be investigated in the light of both price and income effects.  
 
As demonstrated above, taxed export of renewable resource goods implies higher domestic consumption 
and income than does open trade. In actual trade, with a huge number of products and species, the 
increased GDP would allow the import of substitutes for the resource good, e.g. cheaper fish in place of 
expensive fish. This may be an advantage for poor people in the case of high-value fish for export, such IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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as some lobsters, crabs and prawns. In total, the domestic consumption of cheap, but still nutritious, food 
may increase from RET compared with open trade.  
 
Tariff escalation in import countries, especially in many developed countries, used to protect their own 
value-added  processing  industries  may  be  met  by  differentiated  export  taxes.  This  would  neutralise 
negative  employment  effects  that  would  otherwise  occur  and  harm  the  intermediaries’  value-added 
production in the export countries. Using per unit tax or ad valorem tax does not matter in the model 
discussed above, but if we allowed different degrees of value-added per unit of raw material, it usually 
would. In the context of differentiated export taxes it may be that a mix of per unit and ad valorem taxes 
would be optimal.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The  majority  of  commercially-exploited  and  monitored  fish  stocks  globally  are  fully  exploited  or 
overexploited, that is, at or below their maximum sustainable-yield stock-level [8]. In addition, there are 
thousands of stocks of marine fish, shellfish, crustaceans and seaweed harvested for which there hardly 
exists  any  scientific  monitoring  programme.  In  search  of  policy  instruments  to  mitigate  resource 
degradation,  we  have  demonstrated  in  this  paper,  within  the  framework  of  a  two-sector  general 
equilibrium model, that there exists a positive export tax that will increase the gross domestic product and 
increase the resource stock. This is valid for both the case of constant returns-to-scale and the case of 
decreasing returns-to-scale in the other sector of the economy. It is also valid irrespective of whether the 
open-trade solution causes biological overexploitation or not. 
 
In the two-sector economy discussed in this paper, domestic consumption of both the resource good and 
the other good will increase with the introduction of an export tax, within certain limits, on the resource 
good compared with open trade.  
 
We find that an export tax will have the same triple win for aquaculture as for the renewable resource 
industry if there is a negative externality in the production of fish from aquaculture. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
 
                                                 
a Ferreira (2007) demonstrates that a binding quantitative restriction constitutes a second best option in this case. 
 
b For simplicity we disregard the producer surplus that would stem from heterogeneous fishing effort, even under 
open access (Copes, 1972; Nielsen, 2006). 